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‘MAKING CULTURE MATTER’: SYMBOLIC, SPATIAL, AND SOCIAL 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN UYGHUR AND HAN CHINESE. 
Joanne N. Smith 
 
Introduction 
In 1989-1990, Justin Rudelson carried out the first prolonged anthropological 
fieldwork ever to be conducted among the Uyghur
1
 of Xinjiang. Since that time and 
particularly from the mid-nineties on, a number of scholars have been able to conduct 
long-term research in the region, and the fruits of their efforts are now beginning to 
appear.
2
 Some existing studies focus on specific aspects of identity expression among 
Uyghur in certain regions of Xinjiang (see Bellér-Hann 1997 on Uyghur peasants, 
1998 on gendered economic relations, and 2001a on the veneration of the dead in 
southern Xinjiang; Roberts 1998 on the mäšräp ritual in the Ili valley; Joanne Smith 
2000 on ethno-political ideologies among Xinjiang’s urban youth; and Cristina Cesaro 
2000 on food and identity in Ürümchi). Other more general studies stress the relative 
nature of Uyghur discourse on identity, and argue that notions of an ‘imagined 
common history’(or indigeneity) form the basis of contemporary Uyghur national 
identity, which is constructed with reference to the Chinese state and Han Chinese 
hegemony (Gladney 1990, 1996; Rudelson 1997). It has further been shown how this 
national identity disappears among Uyghur born into an émigré community (Gladney 
1996).  
 By contrast, this article seeks to illustrate how Uyghur define and reinforce 
contemporary Uyghur national identity in relation not to the Chinese state but to 
Xinjiang’s growing Han Chinese immigrant population. In the following sections, I 
explore the cultural criteria selected and employed by Uyghur to demarcate and 
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maintain symbolic, spatial, and social ethnic boundaries between themselves and Han 
Chinese in Xinjiang in the 1990s.
3
  It is shown how these boundaries are negotiated 
such that they dictate the conditions under which Uyghur and Han may interact and 
ensure segregation in situations where they should not. Finally, the underlying factors 
influencing the current reinforcement of symbolic, spatial, and social boundaries will 
be analysed. One year was spent in Xinjiang between September 1995 and September 
1996 conducting fieldwork mainly among Uyghur in Ürümchi, in addition to short-
term periods in Kucha, Aqsu, Qäšqär, and Xotän. An ethnographic approach was 
adopted in order to gather information ‘straight from the horse’s mouth.’ During the 
first six months of the fieldwork period, I learnt Uyghur so that I might hold 
conversations with respondents in their mother tongue. The core of the empirical data 
comprises informal conversations with Uyghur of both sexes, of various ages and 
social groups, and from various localities. It also includes qualitative observations of 
practices and interactions among Uyghur, as well as interactions between Uyghur, 
Han Chinese, and other minority nationalities in Xinjiang.
4
  
 
Self-Ascription and Relativity (‘Us and Them’) 
Throughout this paper, a number of theoretical assumptions are made. Firstly, I adopt 
the central notion that ethnic identities (and symbols of those identities) must be 
selected by group members themselves, this process being called self-ascription. An 
ethnic group can only be defined and structured from within, and only those 
‘objective’ differences considered significant by the actors themselves are taken into 
account.
5
  De Vos provides a list of potential criteria for cultural difference, including 
racial uniqueness (some sense of genetically inherited difference), place of origin, 
economic independence (secured by community organisation within the plural 
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society), religious beliefs and practices, aesthetic cultural forms (e.g. food, dress, 
dance), and language. In choosing some or all of these criteria as symbols of identity, 
group members define the way in which they differentiate themselves from other 
groups.
6
 This set of cultural criteria is rarely maintained in its entirety through time 
and space. Most ethnic groups include cultural forms in the past that are clearly 
excluded in the present. Similarly, while a group spread over ecologically varying 
territory will display regional diversities of cultural practice, self-identification as a 
group member may nonetheless continue.
7
 
 The second assumption made is that ethnicity is not isolated (i.e., absolute in a 
primordial sense), but relative. In other words, ethnic distinctions cannot exist within 
a vacuum of contact and information, but rather entail social processes of exclusion 
and incorporation embodied in the construction and maintenance of ethnic 
boundaries.
8
 There can only be ‘insiders’ where there are also perceived to be 
‘outsiders.’ Ethnicity can therefore only develop if an ethnic group is in regular 
contact with another group or groups from whom it considers itself substantially 
different (or against whom it has reason to want to differentiate itself): “I identify 
myself with a collective we which is then contrasted with some other...What we are, 
or what the other is will depend upon context.”9  Ethnic boundaries – like ethnic 
identities themselves – are fluid and negotiable and will appear, change shape, and 
vanish in relation to changing social, political, and economic contexts. Accordingly, 
group members may employ different cultural criteria at different times in order to 
define themselves against different groups.
10
  
This theoretical framework is particularly useful when considering the case of 
the Uyghur of Xinjiang because it takes account of the notion of change. Central to 
this paper is the idea that while Uyghur are currently employing certain religio-
 4 
cultural differences in order to dictate and control patterns of interaction with the Han 
Chinese, those same differences apparently did not prevent Uyghur from interacting 
with the Han in the past (in a different socio-economic context). Nor do those 
differences stop Uyghur from interacting with Han Chinese in the present context 
when it suits them to do so. The impact on Uyghur-Han relations of the vast socio-
economic changes occurring in Xinjiang over the past ten to fifteen years has hitherto 
been given insufficient attention in the anthropological and sociological literature. 
This paper will argue that Uyghur in the mid- to late nineties are activating and 
exaggerating religio-cultural differences between themselves and the Han as a means 
of demarcating a unified ethnic identity in relation (or in reaction) to increased 
competition from Han immigrants in the spheres of education and work, and growing 
perceptions of socio-economic inequalities.  
 
Emergence of ‘Us and Them’ Dichotomy and Eclipse of Oasis Identities  
It is crucial next to outline the background to the present ‘local situation’ in Xinjiang. 
Over the past century, the region Westerners once called East Turkestan has been 
formally incorporated into China and the resulting increased Uyghur interaction with 
the Chinese state and the Han Chinese people has played a significant role in shaping 
modern Uyghur identities. Following the conversion to Islam of the last remaining 
Buddhist Uyghur of Gaochang in the mid-1400s, the ethnonym ‘Uyghur’ was 
abandoned and for the next five hundred years Uyghur identified themselves using 
terms denoting social group (e.g. ‘merchant’) or oasis origin (reflecting the 
geographical isolation of the region’s disparate oases).11 It was only in 1821, when the 
Qing dynasty began to encourage mass Han immigration to the region in an effort to 
incorporate it into the Han Chinese realm, that Uyghur began to unite against the 
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perceived dominant hegemony.
12
 Yet the ethnonym ‘Uyghur’ did not reappear until 
1921, when Soviet advisors at a conference in Taškänt proposed that the name 
‘Uyghur’ be used to designate all those people hitherto known by names denoting 
oasis origin. This proposal was duly adopted in 1934 by the then Xinjiang provincial 
government.
13
  
Drawing on fieldwork carried out in 1989-1990, Rudelson has emphasised the 
continued predominance of local oasis and social group identities over other identities 
in Xinjiang.
14
 Yet my fieldwork data of 1995-1996 suggest that, since the time that 
Rudelson was conducting research in Turpan, contemporary Uyghur identity has 
undergone significant changes, in response both to changing international politics (the 
collapse of Eastern Europe in 1989, the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, and the 
subsequent formation of the CIS republics) and to changing socio-economic 
circumstances within Xinjiang itself. Certainly, Uyghur in the nineties and beyond 
like to distinguish between the unique features of different oases, and these 
differences evoke a certain atmosphere of local competition. For instance, all Uyghur 
prefer their particular hometown, and insist that it is better than the others. However, 
such assertions rarely take the form of an attack, and do not seem to stem from some 
powerful ethnic sentiment. Uyghur attitudes towards Han immigrants are by contrast 
characterised by disgust, anger, bitterness, passion, and a strong sense of injustice. 
This paper argues that traditional oasis rivalries may now have been largely (but 
perhaps temporarily) eclipsed by a new religio-cultural and socio-economic threat: 
Xinjiang’s Han Chinese immigrant population. If we follow this theory, then oasis 
differences like regional foods, styles of dress or wedding practices become less 
significant when confronted by alien cultural practices and economic competition 
from without. The fact that the vast majority of criticisms made to me by Uyghur 
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were levelled not at Uyghur from other oases but at Han Chinese immigrants is 
indicative of the emergence of just such a new ethnic dichotomy in Xinjiang. 
The present consolidation of Uyghur identity across the region and the 
resulting reinforcement of ethnic boundaries vis-à-vis the Han can be attributed in part 
to three ‘internal factors’ (in addition to changes in the international political arena – 
the ‘external factors’). These are: a) The Chinese government’s policy of mass Han 
Chinese immigration to Xinjiang; b) The de facto institutionalisation of the Chinese 
language; and c) (Perceived) Han Chinese exploitation of Xinjiang’s natural 
resources. I will examine each in turn, beginning with immigration policy. Like the 
Manchus and the Chinese Nationalists, the Chinese Communists have consistently 
advocated mass Han Chinese immigration to Xinjiang, largely as an attempt to 
stabilise this important border region. Immigration to the Northwest has been 
facilitated over the past half century by the extension of the railway first from 
Lanzhou to Ürümchi, and then from Ürümchi to Qorla and on to Qäšqär. Many new 
roads have been constructed in the region, including the Ürümchi-Xotän desert 
highway, which was completed in recent years and became the first road to cross the 
hostile Taqlamaqan desert. These improvements in communications, along with Han 
development of Xinjiang into a territory suitable for large-scale settlement, have 
greatly speeded the immigration process. As a result, the number of Han Chinese 
immigrants in Xinjiang has drawn gradually closer to the number of local 
inhabitants.
15
  
Continued Han immigration to Xinjiang has had three visible effects on life in 
the region. Firstly, as the number of Han Chinese has grown, pressure on fragile 
ethnic boundaries has increased, making religio-cultural differences harder to manage. 
Previously, Han Chinese settled in areas separate from Uyghur ‘Old Towns,’ and 
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contact between Han immigrants and local people was limited. More recently, 
however, they have begun to settle not only in urban areas (Ürümchi and Han Chinese 
‘New Towns’) but also in rural areas. Furthermore, Uyghur have themselves begun to 
move into Han-dominated sectors, lured by new opportunities in education, 
employment, and trade. The result is a higher instance of (intentional or unintentional) 
boundary crossing. Secondly, the increase in Han numbers has led to growing Uyghur 
perceptions of socio-economic inequalities between ethnic groups in Xinjiang (such 
that the unemployment rate among Uyghur, for example, is blamed on the increase in 
Han immigrants). Finally, the growth of the Han immigrant population has had a 
profound effect on the immigrants themselves. Finding themselves the numerical 
majority in some urban areas of Xinjiang (notably, Ürümchi and Aqsu), Han Chinese 
are now unwilling to adapt to Uyghur culture and, instead, expect Uyghur to adapt to 
Han culture.  This has led Uyghur to complain of Great Han chauvinism
16
 and ethnic 
discrimination. 
 The second internal factor contributing to the present consolidation of Uyghur 
identity vis-à-vis the Han is the de facto imposition of the Chinese language. Over the 
past half-century, the Chinese language has been all but institutionalised in the 
spheres that matter: education, work, and regional administration. As a result, urban 
Uyghur find themselves increasingly caught in a web of socio-economic 
discrimination. To have a good chance to become fluent in Chinese and so be able to 
survive a university course, Uyghur children must normally go to a Han Chinese 
school.
17
 Uyghur who fail to reach university (usually minkaomin
18
) - and even 
minkaomin who have been through university - are discriminated against by Han-
dominated work units and companies who prefer to hire employees fluent in the 
Chinese language and well versed in Han culture (i.e., Han immigrants or 
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minkaohan
19
). This has led to a higher unemployment rate among Uyghur than Han, 
and increasingly bitter perceptions among Uyghur that high-status, white-collar posts 
are all held by Han immigrants. The situation is worsened by the fact that many 
Uyghur parents are either afraid or unwilling to send their children to Han schools. On 
the one hand, Uyghur children often suffer ethnic discrimination at the hands of Han 
Chinese classmates. On the other, many parents wish to try to preserve Uyghur 
culture through Uyghur education. Uyghur resentment of the Han, then, emanates 
partly from a growing awareness that the de facto institutionalisation of the Chinese 
language has led to their effective marginalisation in a new urban social hierarchy 
created by Han Chinese for Han Chinese in developed urban areas.
20
 
 Finally, Uyghur perceptions of Han Chinese exploitation of Xinjiang’s natural 
resources play a salient role in the current reinforcement of ethnic boundaries. The 
depth of Uyghur feeling regarding the issues of discrimination in the urban labour 
market and Han exploitation of the region’s oil, coal, and other deposits is reflected in 
the evidently strong desire to bring these issues up, often at the first meeting. For 
many young urban males, notions of control of Xinjiang’s natural resources and of 
political independence from the People’s Republic of China go hand in hand. They 
feel that Han Chinese can be allowed to stay on one condition only: that they help 
Uyghur to develop on an equal basis with Han Chinese immigrants.  
 
 
Boundary Dynamics (Symbolic, Spatial, Social)  
Having provided the background to the local situation in Xinjiang, I will now explore 
the dynamics of boundary maintenance between the two groups. This section 
examines those criteria for cultural difference that are ‘made to matter,’ that is, 
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employed by Uyghur to emphasise their contrastive ethnic identities through the 
demarcation of a complex system of ethnic boundaries. Some of these boundaries are 
symbolic (cultural differences that are given symbolic meaning in patterns of 
interaction); others are more concrete (ensuring spatial and social segregation). 
Uyghur across the region currently link many of their criticisms of the Han Chinese 
directly to the fact that Han are non-Muslims. Correspondingly, many of the cultural 
differences chosen to demarcate boundaries between themselves and the Han have 
their roots in Islam. In particular, Islamic avoidance of pork is employed at the present 
time to enforce spatial and social segregation.
21
 
 
Symbolic 
The first symbolic boundary is constructed through language. Most Uyghur express 
their preference for the Uyghur language by making clear distinctions between the 
home environment and ‘the outside,’ corresponding to times when they speak Uyghur 
and times when they consent to speak Chinese. Although many urban Uyghur, 
particularly Ürümchiliks, are fluent in or can speak a certain amount of Chinese, most 
emphasise that Chinese is a language of practical convenience only. Tömür (a 
minkaohan in his forties) is employed by a Han Chinese work unit in Ürümchi.
22
 He 
became very excited when I asked him which language he generally used, and 
outlined the boundaries of the respective languages thus: “Oh, we may speak Chinese 
outside...but we all speak Uyghur as soon as we get home!” By ‘outside,’ he meant 
environments where Uyghur interact with Han Chinese who cannot speak Uyghur. 
These are usually state work units or private companies set up by Han Chinese that 
employ mainly Han staff, and where all administrative paperwork is in the Chinese 
language. At home, however, almost all Uyghur speak Uyghur. The exceptions to this 
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rule are some minkaohan, who tend to have a stronger foundation in Chinese than in 
their native language and often code-switch at home.  
In university dormitories, minkaomin speak Uyghur to one another. They also 
speak Uyghur to minkaohan roommates until the latter show signs of discomfort. 
Then they speak in a mixture of Uyghur and Chinese, or entirely in Chinese, until the 
point has been grasped. In this way, the rules are slightly altered to accommodate the 
minkaohan, who sometimes have problems expressing themselves in Uyghur, 
especially in academic conversations.  
On the street, it is taken for granted that conversations between Uyghur are 
carried out in Uyghur, whether the other person is an acquaintance or a stranger. In 
Ürümchi’s Uyghur-dominated Erdaoqiao district, Uyghur always spoke to me in 
Uyghur first, breaking into Chinese only if they perceived that I could not understand. 
The best examples of the Uyghur preference to speak Uyghur came from ‘accidental’ 
observations of interactions between Uyghur. Once, while browsing in Ürümchi’s 
Hongshan department store, I witnessed a Uyghur man approach the counter and, 
without looking up, begin talking to the store assistant (whom he assumed to be Han) 
in Chinese. Halfway through his sentence, he glanced up, saw that she was Uyghur, 
and instantly switched to speaking in Uyghur. They both laughed and he apologised 
for his mistake. The same thing happened on another occasion when I boarded a bus 
with Räwiä, a French language specialist, in Ürümchi. She initially addressed the 
Uyghur bus conductress (whose facial features were closer than usual to those of Han 
Chinese) in Chinese, but changed to Uyghur halfway through the sentence and 
apologised. Räwiä is minkaohan and therefore probably more comfortable with 
Chinese than with Uyghur. Yet she was quick to correct her mistake. Her action 
represented a public acknowledgement of mutual ethnic origin and of shared 
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difference vis-à-vis the Han Chinese. Once, I was eating with Šöhrat, a young male 
archaeologist from Ürümchi, in a Uyghur street restaurant in Turpan and was dressed 
in winter clothing typical of an Ürümchilik woman. As I had only just begun learning 
Uyghur, we conversed in Chinese for convenience’ sake. When we left, we overheard 
two old Uyghur in the corner mutter: “But she’s a Uyghur girl! Why on earth is she 
speaking in Chinese?” To them, it was inconceivable that Uyghur should speak 
Chinese to one another while eating lunch in a non-Han environment. 
Whether they want to or not, many Uyghur are now forced to master Chinese 
if they are to compete with Han immigrants. However, they describe the decision to 
learn Chinese as a purely strategic career choice, claiming that the only way to get 
ahead in the Han-created urban society in Ürümchi is through fluency in Chinese. 
Learning Chinese is thus seen as a means of survival. Regarding the trend in recent 
years of putting Uyghur children in Han Chinese schools, Tömür said: “I’ll tell you, 
there’s only one reason why we learn to speak Chinese, and that’s just to get a better 
job!” This view was echoed by Räwiä and many other Uyghur parents in Ürümchi 
throughout the year. Aliyä, a female postgraduate studying dentistry in Ürümchi, 
explained: “We speak Chinese because of its dominant position in this society. There 
is no way around it. Uyghur is not as important as Chinese now.” Despite the 
acknowledgement, she spoke Uyghur at all times except when speaking to Han 
Chinese or when intermingling Uyghur and Chinese for the sake of minkaohan dorm-
mates.  
Most Uyghur (with the exception of minkaohan) prefer to read and write in the 
Uyghur script. Periodicals and journals containing minority-nationality literature have 
appeared all over Xinjiang since the early eighties and the re-introduction of more 
relaxed minority policies.
23
 In 1986, at least twelve journals were being published in 
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Uyghur in Xinjiang.
24
 In 1996, over seventy different publications appeared in 
Uyghur, indicating that there is a large audience of literate Uyghur who increasingly 
prefer to read in their native language. There are also many Uyghur language 
newspapers in addition to several Uyghur language television channels. Most 
southerners watch the Uyghur language channels in preference to the Chinese 
language channels, although Ürümchiliks (who tend to be at least semi-fluent in 
Chinese due to the large Han population in the city) also like to watch soap operas or 
dramas on the Chinese channels.  
Urban Uyghur frequently register rejection of the Chinese language by making 
it the object of humour or ridicule. The most common example is the Chinese 
expression Man man zou! (literally, “Walk slowly” or “Go slowly”), uttered when a 
person takes leave. On one occasion, Sultan, a specialist in Russian literature in his 
fifties, joked: “Why would anyone want to walk slowly? They should walk quickly! 
Otherwise they will never get to where they are going before night falls!” That 
Uyghur intellectuals strive to compare the Uyghur language favourably to Chinese 
indicates that they feel themselves to a certain degree to be in cultural competition 
with Han Chinese. 
 In rural areas, however, boundaries concerning language use are more blurred. 
Uyghur peasants, many of whom have received little education in either Chinese or 
Uyghur, are often proud to show off their limited knowledge of Chinese. Ömärjan, a 
peasant in his sixties in Aqsu, translated all the terms for the crops he raised into the 
equivalent Chinese for me. For him, the ability to speak a few words of Chinese 
carried novelty value and was an evident source of pleasure and pride. It seems that, 
for Uyghur peasants living in relatively Han-free areas and still untouched by 
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discrimination of language in the spheres of education and work, the Chinese 
language remains free of stigma. 
 Time is another criterion through which Uyghur (and other Central Asians in 
Xinjiang) draw a symbolic boundary between themselves and Han Chinese. It is the 
vehicle through which they underline their belongingness to the land vis-à-vis the Han 
Chinese and the Hui Muslims, whom they perceive to be newcomers. While the 
watches and clocks of one half of Xinjiang’s population read 10 a.m., those belonging 
to the other half insist that it is still 8 a.m. Further investigation into this strange 
circumstance reveals that, while Han Chinese and Hui Muslims use China’s official 
‘Beijing time,’ Uyghur, Qazaqs, Özbäks, Tajiks, and others all use ‘Xinjiang time,’ 
the local time congruent with the region’s topological position and two hours behind 
‘Beijing time.’ Änwär, a minkaohan interpreter in his thirties from Ürümchi, 
explained: “You see, all the original inhabitants of Xinjiang use local time. It’s what 
we’re used to.”25 By ‘original inhabitants,’ he indicated people of Central Asian origin 
who have lived in the region for centuries. Over the next few weeks, it became clear 
that while official Han Chinese work units (companies, shops, railway stations) used 
‘Beijing time,’ the Central Asian peoples of the region were unanimous in their 
continued use of local time.
26
  
Uyghur persist in using local time despite the obvious inconveniences (for 
example, the constant need to ask: “Do you mean Xinjiang time or Beijing time?”). 
On the one hand, their persistence in using local time as opposed to Beijing time 
reflects a desire to stick to old habits and practices. However, it also represents a 
symbolic rejection of Han Chinese hegemony and administration, all the more 
remarkable in the light of the inconvenience it causes to all concerned. It represents a 
symbolic boundary between the ‘original’ Central Asian inhabitants and the Han 
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Chinese and Hui Muslim ‘newcomers.’ The time question is further complicated by 
the fact that Hui Muslims regard ‘Beijing time’ and ‘Xinjiang time’ as one and the 
same thing. When asked which system they used, they usually replied ‘Xinjiang time’ 
or ‘Ürümchi time.’ On closer questioning, it transpired that they actually used Beijing 
time but called it ‘Xinjiang time.’ Like the Han Chinese, the Hui consider Beijing 
time the standard time for Xinjiang as for all regions of China. This is probably one 
factor contributing to the mutual mistrust between Uyghur and Hui Muslims in 
Xinjiang. 
Still, there are some Uyghur who use Beijing time either because they are 
simply accustomed to using it or because their job requires that they do. These 
individuals include some (but by no means all) minkaohan and some Uyghur who 
work in Han Chinese work units or whose spouses do. The former attended Han 
Chinese schools where Beijing time was used throughout their school lives. The latter 
have to use Beijing time every day in the work environment. In particular, a Uyghur 
whose job is concerned with timetables (rail station, travel agency) uses Beijing time 
simply because it is too confusing to persevere with local time. Nevertheless, the 
majority of Uyghur working in Han Chinese work units keep their watches set to local 
time and calculate the time difference.  
One factor that has led Uyghur and other Central Asian Muslims in rural areas 
(particularly the south) to draw boundaries between themselves and the Han Chinese 
is their attitude towards birth control. Uyghur opinion on birth control is divided along 
north-south and urban-rural lines. Although many northern urbanites have begun to 
espouse the ‘modern’ conception of smaller families and are not particularly averse to 
family planning,
27
 southerners and Uyghur in rural areas abide by the Islamic notion 
that children are ‘a blessing from Allah’ and tend to be strongly opposed to CCP birth 
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control policy.
28
 Southern Uyghur often enquired if there was birth control in 
England, and wanted to know why Westerners usually had small families (that is, 
whether they were constrained to by law). Tursun, one peasant in his thirties from a 
small village in Aqsu, lamented that Uyghur could do nothing about birth control 
policy in Xinjiang “because our king is the Han.”29 I asked another recently married 
young Aqsuliq how many children he would have if there were no mandatory birth 
control. He replied airily: “Oh, twenty or thirty! It can’t be helped.” Although this 
figure was exaggerated for comic value, he was clearly desirous of having lots of 
children. Perhaps more significantly, he considered pregnancy to be a matter out of 
his hands and dependent on the discretion of Xuda (Allah).  
In 1996, southern peasants were unanimously unhappy with the family 
planning methods being enforced by Han Chinese authorities. Many women in the 
countryside had never seen a condom. Tursun’s wife, Arzigül, originally had an IUD 
coil fitted after having her third child, but this caused headaches, incessant bleeding, 
and extreme weakness. When she went to the doctor, he removed the coil 
immediately and said that she might have died had he not done so. Many women in 
the area have reportedly died from using the coil, which seems to have been routinely 
fitted. Now, Arzigül takes a birth control pill prescribed by her local hospital, but 
suffers frequent headaches. A visit to the family planning clinic in Aqsu New Town 
revealed that the authorities are heavily promoting a new pill, which serves as a 
morning-after pill or in varying doses as a drug that induces miscarriage. Glossy 
adverts on the clinic wall proclaim it safe, painless, and 100 per cent effective.  
Tursun and Arzigül stated that those who have more than the legal quota of 
children face fines of between 8,000-10,000 yuan (compared with the rural family’s 
annual income of 5,000 yuan in a good year). They also confirmed frequent reports of 
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pregnant women in the south being rounded up, loaded onto trucks, and taken away 
for mandatory abortions. Those who do have more than three children are forced to 
send the fourth or fifth child to live with relatives elsewhere. Alternatively, the mother 
may give the child over to a childless woman to bring up as her own. Although a 
small minority of urban southern women would prefer to bear fewer children, for the 
vast majority of southern and rural Uyghur, the issue of birth control has become the 
main focus of opposition to Han rule, if not necessarily to Han Chinese as individuals.   
A further symbolic boundary between Uyghur and Han Chinese is the current 
Uyghur-enforced taboo on intermarriage. Although Uyghur and Han intermarried in 
the past, such an idea was unacceptable by the 1990s. The chief reason cited for this 
development is differences in religio-cultural practices. One young Ürümchilik 
woman told me: 
 
We believe in different religions. Before, there was intermarriage, but nowadays 
there is none. Once a couple gets older, they start to realise their customs and 
practices are different. And their religions are different. One person says one thing 
and the other says something else. They can’t agree. It almost always ends in 
divorce. 
 
For Uyghur and other Central Asian Muslims, national customs are almost 
inseparable from Islam. Past experimentation seems to have proved to many that 
marriage to a non-Muslim can be fraught with difficulty. Liu Lan, a 20 year-old 
erzhuanzi
30
 whose parents had divorced twelve years before, explained that “national 
sentiment had proved too strong” on the side of her Uyghur mother. Many older 
Uyghur also reported that they had seen mixed marriages fail. A friend of Räwiä’s 
concluded: “Two separate races of people still have areas that are very different at the 
end of the day. These differences cannot be resolved with love.” This woman was 
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minkaohan. Although minkaohan are generally supposed to be culturally closer to 
Han Chinese, most nonetheless reject the option of intermarriage.   
 In 1995 and 1996, young Uyghur rarely had romantic relationships with Han 
Chinese. Those that did came under attack from Uyghur elders and peers. I spoke to a 
19 year-old girl from Ürümchi who had a Han Chinese boyfriend. She told me: “It’s 
really hard for us to even go out anywhere. If other Uyghur see us together in public, 
they give us trouble. If Uyghur men see us together on a public bus, they swear at us 
and hit us. Uyghur women aren’t so bad, but they still make comments.” The young 
woman’s elder sister (a model in Beijing) also planned to marry a Han Chinese. 
Under the weight of public disapproval, the mother would not allow her younger 
daughter’s marriage to go ahead in Xinjiang, even though the Han boyfriend had 
given up pork and begun to learn the Uyghur language (thereby removing what 
barriers he could that might obstruct the match). She agreed, however, to the elder 
sister’s marriage, since the wedding would take place far away from Xinjiang, and her 
married life would be spent in Beijing away from public pressure. This suggests that 
rather than religio-cultural differences per se, it is the threat of disapproval from 
within the Uyghur community that rules out intermarriage at present. Uyghur in the 
nineties are coming under significant pressure from ethnic peers to conform to 
patterns of ethnic segregation.  
 
Spatial  
In each of Xinjiang’s oases, there is a similar pattern of spatial segregation of Uyghur 
and Han Chinese. Each oasis has an Old Town (kona šähär) and a New Town (yengi 
šähär). The populations of the Old Towns are composed entirely of Uyghur. The 
populations of the New Towns are composed mainly of Han Chinese immigrants, but 
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include a proportion of Uyghur employed in Han Chinese work units. The one 
exception to this rule is Ürümchi, where there is no division of New Town and Old 
Town. The entire city might be described as a New Town in which Han Chinese 
immigrants dominate all districts except one: the Uyghur district of Erdaoqiao in the 
south-east. In Erdaoqiao, there are next to no Han Chinese. Comparatively small 
numbers of Uyghur are spread throughout the Han Chinese districts.  
In this case, the boundary has been drawn by the Han Chinese. From the start, 
the Chinese government pursued a policy of settling Han immigrants in areas not 
settled by Uyghur, or in New Towns that were constructed adjacent to the Uyghur’ 
Old Towns.
31
  In this way, they probably hoped to manage religio-cultural differences 
(in particular, the raising of pigs by the Han Chinese as against the Uyghur avoidance 
of pork) and so avoid conflict. It is likely that the policy also made the prospect of 
immigration more appealing to new Han settlers, many of whom were reluctant to 
move to Xinjiang, which they perceived as a distant and hostile territory. 
 In the present context, it would be untrue to say that all Uyghur prefer to live 
separately in Old Towns. On the contrary, there is evidence to suggest that many are 
willing to compromise and go to New Towns if a good job and a new house beckons. 
Loufang
32
 homes in New Towns all have water supplied on tap, and so the problem of 
sharing a common water supply to wash ‘clean’ and ‘unclean’ meat does not exist. In 
addition, some minkaohan have, over many years at Han schools, partly internalised 
the Han Chinese perception of hygiene and beauty. As a result, they prefer the clean 
new loufang homes to the traditional one-storey Uyghur homes of Old Towns, which 
are made of earth and trap the dust.  
Despite this concession, Uyghur endeavour to ensure and maintain spatial 
segregation as far as possible. They do so by laying a deliberate emphasis on the 
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Islamic avoidance of pork. Certainly, Uyghur, as Muslims, must strictly avoid eating 
pork or coming into contact with pigs. Yet in the present context, Uyghur are not 
simply adhering to dietary prescriptions for their own sake. Rather, they are actively 
employing dietary differences as a means to distinguish between ‘clean’ (Uyghur) and 
‘unclean’ (Han) people.33 A middle-aged Uyghur doctor in Xotän observes: “There 
are still huge differences in culture between the two nationalities. For instance, food. 
A Uyghur will not eat pork, although the Han do. If a Uyghur ate pork, he would no 
longer be a Uyghur. It is as simple as that.” Han immigrants in Xinjiang similarly 
identify Islamic dietary prescriptions as the main factor complicating interaction 
between the two groups at present. A young Han woman in Ürümchi explained that 
Uyghur rules governing diet were so strict that in the rare case of Han Chinese 
marrying Uyghur, they must drink a bitter concoction to sterilise their intestines and 
then convert to the Muslim diet. Yet the rules surrounding avoidance of pork do not 
appear to be hard-and-fast. Rather, Uyghur seem to be constantly negotiating this 
boundary, which is permeated with contradictions and with concessions made in 
particular circumstances.
34
  
The boundary operates firstly on a symbolic level. The scandal surrounding 
zhuancha (brick tea) from the mid-nineties provides adequate demonstration.
35
 During 
1995-1996, several Uyghur in Ürümchi told me they had ceased drinking brick tea, a 
tea imported from China proper and once popular among Uyghur. Upon further 
enquiry, they explained that a Uyghur reporter had a few years earlier circulated some 
photographs, allegedly showing Han Chinese workers slaughtering pigs within a brick 
tea factory complex in China proper. They added that the pictures also showed Han 
workers trampling the tealeaves while sweating profusely. Although there was clear 
doubt surrounding the validity of the evidence, the ensuing scandal united many 
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Uyghur in a boycott of the product for five months, a boycott inspired not only by the 
alleged presence of pigs in the factory grounds but also by the vision of Han Chinese 
sweat soaking into the leaves. According to Šöhrat, the young male archaeologist in 
Ürümchi, the Chinese government later launched a campaign to persuade Uyghur to 
resume drinking brick tea (sales from the tea make up a large proportion of profits 
from three Chinese provinces, including Hubei and Hunan). Subsequently, many 
people did not know what to believe, and brick tea lovers began to drink it once more.  
The food boundary should in theory necessitate spatial segregation between 
Uyghur and Han Chinese in many environments. However, on close investigation, it 
becomes evident that Uyghur employ dietary differences to ensure spatial segregation 
only insofar as it suits them to do so, and often make concessions if they stand to 
benefit. For example, if one examines patterns of Uyghur patronage of different 
eateries, a number of apparent contradictions emerge. In Ürümchi and urban areas of 
Xinjiang, signs outside restaurants state whether food served inside is hancan (‘Han 
cuisine,’ including pork and therefore ‘unclean’) or qingzhen (‘pure and true,’ 
avoiding pork and selling mutton and beef dishes). Within this basic distinction, there 
are three types of restaurant: a) Han-managed hancan restaurants which sell Han 
Chinese food including pork dishes; b) Han-managed qingzhen restaurants which 
serve Chinese- and Uyghur-style dishes but avoid pork; c) Uyghur and Hui qingzhen 
restaurants serving ‘pure and true’ Xinjiang dishes.  
Uyghur avoid the hancan restaurant without exception. This is an understood 
social fact in Xinjiang. Following my arrival in the city, Uyghur at the local market 
quickly attempted to dissuade me from entering hancan restaurants, arguing with Han 
Chinese who invited me into their establishments: “She doesn’t eat Han food! She 
eats Muslim food, don’t you?” In this way, they tried to ensure that I would eat only 
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qingzhen foods while in Xinjiang and thereby align myself (culturally and politically) 
with them. It made no difference that I might well eat pork when in the UK; indeed, 
Uyghur chose to believe that I did not. In this way, Uyghur used the food boundary as 
a means to reject the Han people but chose not to apply the same rules to 
Westerners.
36
  
If dietary requirements truly represented a hard-and-fast rule, one might 
expect that Uyghur would refuse to enter any establishment where food comes into 
contact with Han Chinese. Yet I found, for example, that Uyghur eat in Han-managed 
qingzhen restaurants under certain circumstances. Uyghur from my work unit 
(minkaohan and minkaomin) usually ate in nearby Han-managed qingzhen restaurants 
when lunching with Han Chinese work colleagues. I also observed that groups of 
young Uyghur (again, minkaohan and minkaomin) liked to hold birthday parties and 
other special events in Han-managed qingzhen establishments, though they ate in 
Uyghur or Hui qingzhen restaurants at most other times. It is notable, however, that 
they were rarely if ever accompanied by Han Chinese.
37
 The Han Chinese managers 
of these restaurants rarely conform to the Muslim diet themselves, and are evidently 
only interested in increasing profits. By excluding pork dishes from the menu, they 
can attract both Han and Uyghur customers. When I questioned why Uyghur should 
consent to eat in a restaurant whose manager, chefs, and waitresses came into regular 
contact with pork at home and possibly also during their lunch break (and which 
might therefore be considered ritually ‘unclean’), Šöhrat, the young archaeologist 
from Ürümchi, countered: “But have you noticed that it is a certain type of Uyghur 
who goes there? Those who went to Han schools [minkaohan]. They’re not so fussy 
about things like that. And, also, those who haven’t received a higher education. They 
haven’t thought of all the implications, you see.” He thus admitted (albeit unwittingly) 
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that the only type of Uyghur not to eat in Han-managed qingzhen restaurants is the 
educated minkaomin like himself, of whom there are relatively few.  
Uyghur willingly eat in either Uyghur or Hui restaurants since both are 
qingzhen. Yet given the choice, they will usually enter Uyghur rather than Hui 
establishments. Some Uyghur explained that they were not so keen on the flavour of 
noodles served in Hui restaurants, complaining that Hui did not know how to cook 
läghmän
38
 sauce and always put in too many chilli peppers.
39
 Uyghur restaurants are 
distinguishable by the sheep carcasses that hang outside, which indicate that meat sold 
there is halal (‘clean’).  
On university campuses, kitchens and dining halls are segregated. Lunchtime 
visits to Ürümchi’s Universities of Medicine and Education revealed separate queues 
before the hancan and qingzhen serving hatches, the former queue composed entirely 
of Han Chinese students, the latter of mainly Uyghur students. Likewise, universities 
usually have separate dorms for Uyghur and Han Chinese, in order to manage dietary 
differences. Yet Uyghur informed me that they sometimes chose to live in mixed 
dorms in order that they might practise their Chinese with Han roommates (Chinese 
language ability being crucial both for success at university and in the urban job 
market). They claimed that in such cases, Han Chinese students always took care not 
to eat pork in the dormitories and ate out instead, though I did not have the 
opportunity to observe whether this was truly the case. 
  Uyghur often cite the problem of utensils, crockery, and cutlery being 
‘unclean’ as a key factor preventing them from visiting the homes of Han Chinese 
(and ensuring spatial segregation in the domestic sphere).
40
 Yet here, too, there are 
many inconsistencies. For example, Uyghur serve food to Han Chinese customers in 
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Uyghur restaurants every day, meaning that their Uyghur customers come into contact 
with the same plates, bowls, chopsticks, and spoons used by Han (who eat pork). 
When I queried this point, Uyghur usually responded by saying that there was no way 
around this problem since they needed Han Chinese custom to keep their businesses 
ticking over. Šöhrat, the archaeologist from Ürümchi, went on to insist that it was a 
different case when a Han ate in a Uyghur home: “On the few occasions that a Han 
comes to a Uyghur home, the bowl, dish, and chopsticks he uses are thrown away 
afterwards.” I subsequently asked a Uyghur in his late thirties in rural Aqsu whether 
he also followed these guidelines. He shrugged, said that he himself would just wash 
the crockery in hot water, and added that such an extreme attitude was to be expected 
from a Qäšqärliq.41 
 Uyghur also claim to feel disgusted by the sight of live pigs or by the smell of 
pork cooking. It is true that Han immigrants in rural areas have to raise pigs on all-
Han settlements well removed from Uyghur dwellings due to the problem presented 
by the rural water supply. When I asked a Uyghur peasant from Aqsu prefecture 
whether Han Chinese who lived nearby raised pigs, he replied decisively: “No, they 
can’t. They don’t dare. We all use the same water from the same rivers and streams. If 
they raised pigs, the pigs would drink from the streams, the meat would be washed in 
the streams...then the water would flow downstream to us! That would cause big 
problems.” It is also true that Uyghur must not come into physical contact with pigs.42 
Yet I got the distinct impression that urban Uyghur exaggerated their disgust 
regarding pigs and pork in order to better articulate their dislike for the Han Chinese. 
For instance, one young female student in Ürümchi assured me that she and her 
friends always went the long way round at the local market just to avoid passing a 
Han butcher’s stall. In practice, I never noticed her doing so during our own strolls 
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around the market. In Aqsu New Town, a Uyghur chef insisted with some bravado 
that Han could not open many hancan restaurants there since “pork stinks when it is 
cooking.” Nevertheless, this fact has not prevented hancan establishments from 
spreading across Ürümchi. Nor does it prevent Uyghur petty entrepreneurs from 
selling lamb kebabs directly in front of those establishments. 
 
Social  
With the exception of practical relationships formed within the work environment, 
Uyghur do not willingly mix with Han Chinese. Accordingly, ethnic segregation is 
maintained between the two groups in the home environment, on the street, and in all 
social situations. If I asked Uyghur whether they socialised with Han Chinese, the 
enquiry brought a negative click of the tongue or a decisive shake of the head.  
Once more, the principal reason cited for this absence of social interaction is 
different dietary habits.
43
 On a purely practical level, the Han Chinese inclusion of 
pork in the diet makes socialising in many situations that involve food impossible. 
The reality, however, is that Uyghur simply do not want to socialise with Han 
Chinese, and use abstention from pork as a means of ensuring not only spatial but also 
social segregation. The one exception to this rule is lunchtime in the work unit. At 
work, Uyghur seem willing to bend the rules, whether for the sake of protecting their 
jobs or preserving basic harmony in an environment where they are obliged to work 
with Han Chinese on a daily basis. A compromise can be reached in the workplace if 
Han Chinese agree to eat lunch with Uyghur in qingzhen restaurants. However, such 
compromises are rarely made outside the work unit. I had this conversation with a 
Uyghur woman in her forties in Ürümchi: 
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Author:  Do you have any Han friends? 
Uyghur:  Yes, but only at work. 
Author:  So they’re work colleagues? 
Uyghur:  Yes. 
Author:  Don’t you have any close friends you spend time with? 
Uyghur:  We don’t usually socialise with Han. We don't go to their homes. 
Our eating habits aren’t the same. They eat pork...so we don’t like 
to socialise with them. 
 
 
Not only do Uyghur avoid visiting Han Chinese homes but they also feel 
uncomfortable about Han Chinese coming into their homes. A Uyghur peasant in his 
forties in Aqsu told me that Han colleagues occasionally visited his home or the 
homes of his neighbours. At these times, he said, they always asked the Han guest: 
“Would you like something to eat?” Such an enquiry indicates reluctance in Uyghur 
culture and is tantamount to stating that you do not wish to entertain a guest. 
Conventionally, a Uyghur host just produces tea and refreshments and enjoins the 
guest to tuck in: “Yäng! Iching!” (“Eat! Drink!”).  
Ethnic segregation is plainly visible on the streets of Ürümchi and Xinjiang’s 
New Towns, where Han Chinese walk hand in hand, and Uyghur arm in arm, but 
mixed groups are never seen. Similarly, Han Chinese rarely attend Uyghur social 
gatherings,
44
 unless in an official capacity (for example, a Han superior from the work 
unit might briefly drop in on a Uyghur wedding party to pay his respects, or a Uyghur 
businessman might take a Han businessman to a Uyghur dance restaurant). Certainly, 
there is any number of objective reasons why Han Chinese might find it difficult to 
participate in Uyghur social events. Firstly, Uyghur gatherings provide an arena for 
Uyghur to make music, sing, dance, and generally take centre stage. A comparable 
love of public performance does not figure in the social lives of most Han Chinese, 
who do not consider themselves natural show-offs and tend to be less extroverted than 
Uyghur. While many Uyghur love to be in the limelight, Han Chinese are usually 
loath to be the ‘bird that sticks its head out of the nest.’ Participation would also 
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require that Han guests were au fait with traditional Uyghur music and dance. As 
Uyghur like to honour special guests by asking them to dance or sing, one could 
easily imagine that Han guests might soon find themselves in an awkward and 
embarrassing position.  
Secondly, the Uyghur way of serving and consuming food is often different to 
that of the Han (Islamic dietary prescriptions aside). At house parties, for instance, 
Uyghur sit cross-legged in a circle on the floor and feast from the dastixan (special 
tablecloth) rather than sit at table, as Han Chinese do.  
 Thirdly, Han Chinese might be confused by conventional patterns of sexual 
segregation practised by Uyghur men and women at such events. For example, when 
attending birthday parties, Uyghur adults in Ürümchi usually sit at sexually 
segregated tables. It is not so much that an inalienable social law forces them to do so, 
but rather that Uyghur men and women simply feel more comfortable in the company 
of their own sex. During house visits, women often retire to one room while the men 
sit in another. At Ürümchi wedding parties, men sit together down one side of the 
hall, while women sit along the other. At funerals, also, men and women move in 
separate groups. 
Fourthly, Uyghur ceremonies such as weddings, funerals, and circumcisions 
are strongly influenced by Islam and participants require special ‘insider’ knowledge 
in order to understand and fulfil their roles. To give some examples, the young male 
friends of the groom at a Uyghur wedding know that they are responsible for the 
fetching of the bride, which is carried out with much noise, enthusiasm, and playing 
of practical jokes. The door of the bride’s home is barricaded against the men, who 
have to bribe their way in with presents for the bride and her family. The bride knows 
that her passage to the groom’s home or the hall will later be blocked, and she in turn 
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must buy her entry with presents given to the men. Female guests, on the other hand, 
know that they should bring pieces of cloth or money gifts to be collected as presents 
for the bride. 
 Uyghur funeral ceremonies similarly require ‘insider’ knowledge in order to 
run smoothly. The ceremonies are held in the home of the deceased or of their 
relatives, and the bereaved rely heavily on the support of neighbours. Räwiä, the 
French language specialist from Ürümchi, related how Ürümchiliks particularly regret 
having Han Chinese neighbours at the time of a death: 
 
When Uyghur have a death in the family, that’s when they most wish they had 
other Uyghur as neighbours. Especially during the first week after the death, 
friends and relatives come to the house with gifts of food, since the family is too 
beside itself with grief to cook. With so many guests coming every day, the 
family will really wish it had Uyghur neighbours, who would simply open up 
their homes and allow the guests to overflow into their houses.
45
 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, the close relatives of the deceased must know how and when to cry. The 
‘crying’ (similar to wailing or the recitation of Islamic verses) is loud, theatrical and 
very public. It demonstrates to relatives, friends, and neighbours the love that one felt 
for the deceased. If close relatives do not cry at the moment of death and throughout 
the first day, they are criticised and it is assumed that they did not care for the 
deceased person. To a Westerner or Han Chinese, however, the crying seems almost 
unearthly.  
Finally, the vast majority of Han Chinese cannot speak Uyghur and would be 
out of place in an environment where Uyghur is spoken almost exclusively.  
Still, these facts alone should not absolutely prohibit Han Chinese from 
socialising with Uyghur. The wuting (dance hall) within the Chinese work unit is one 
venue where Uyghur and Han Chinese might potentially share a love of dance. 
Although few Han Chinese in Xinjiang can dance traditional Uyghur dance, many 
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enjoy ballroom dancing. Yet after a brief greeting, Uyghur and Han Chinese sit in 
separate groups, Uyghur going to dance with Uyghur, and Han with Han. Uyghur men 
occasionally ask Han Chinese females to dance (usually their next-door neighbours), 
but all return to their separate seating areas afterwards. 
 
The consequences of boundary-crossing: bus stories and street fights  
Where Han Chinese transgress these boundaries, trouble can occur. At a private New 
Year’s party in a Uyghur friend’s street restaurant in Ürümchi, groups of Han Chinese 
twice stumbled through the door and demanded to be served food, or stood grinning at 
the scene. The owners said nothing but looked quietly angry, threw the intruders an 
initial glance, then looked elsewhere as they waited for them to leave. The second 
time this occurred, my host got up with a furious look on his face and bolted the door 
when the offending individuals had gone. 
Situations where Uyghur and Han find themselves unwillingly crammed 
together within a limited physical space, such as on crowded buses or at markets, can 
also breed conflict. I often observed Uyghur and Han Chinese go out of their way to 
avoid sitting next to one another on buses. I heard one story of how two Uyghur 
spread themselves across three seats to prevent a Han policeman from sitting beside 
them. Fights break out on buses over issues as simple as a Han Chinese stepping on a 
Uyghur’s foot. As a result, bus stories have become a favourite subject of Uyghur 
storytelling. Street fights are guaranteed to occur if Han Chinese men dare to 
approach Uyghur women. Romantic relationships between Uyghur and Han Chinese 
are presently taboo, and Uyghur men are extremely protective over the honour of 
female relatives, colleagues, and classmates. Furthermore, they view Uyghur women 
as their monopoly and not to be won by Han Chinese. 
 29 
In the south of the region, ethnic conflicts often occur in public shower-
houses, these being one of the few places where Han and Uyghur are forced to 
interact. In one small village in Aqsu, the shower-houses were not only sexually but 
also ethnically segregated. When I inquired why this was, the local people told me 
that it was “to prevent fights breaking out.”  
 
Managed interaction in the workplace 
There is one environment in which the two ethnic groups contrive to manage 
interaction: the workplace. The mutual pursuit of good jobs, regular salaries, and a 
better livelihood in a competitive urban society has meant that Uyghur and Han 
Chinese have, to a certain extent, learned to live with one another in the work 
environment.  
My observations of Uyghur and Han Chinese employees in work units and 
Han-dominated companies in Ürümchi lead me to believe that relations there are 
relatively friendly, at least on the surface. Uyghur and Han courteously refer to one 
another as ‘Han comrades’ and ‘minority comrades.’ They frequently gossip about 
their colleagues (a phenomenon one might expect to find in any workforce in the 
world). Indeed, a love of gossip is one thing that Uyghur and Han Chinese seem to 
have in common. Uyghur and Han employees usually ask one another their lunch 
plans. If they decide to lunch together, it is Han Chinese colleagues who must 
compromise by accompanying Uyghur colleagues to suitable restaurants that do not 
offend their religious sensibilities. Mixed lunch parties therefore eat in Han-managed 
qingzhen restaurants or Uyghur or Hui Muslim restaurants. 
 There is a certain sense that appearances should be kept up and that harmony 
should be preserved in the workplace. Some Uyghur employ humour to try to smooth 
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the way. I once observed a conversation between a Uyghur academic and a Han 
academic. The Han asked the Uyghur if they would go to a meeting together or if he 
should go alone. The Uyghur replied: “Together, together! Of course we’ll go 
together...after all, we are inextricably bonded, aren’t we?” 46 In this way, he 
attempted to lighten up relations with his Han colleague by making a joke at the 
expense of the Chinese government’s catchphrase ‘nationality unity.’ On this 
occasion, the Han colleague was unsure whether to laugh or not and left the room in 
confusion.  
Relations in the workplace occasionally break down along ethnic lines. This 
tends to happen in situations where minority nationality employees feel that their 
respective languages or cultures are being ignored or played down by Han colleagues. 
Alternatively, an employee who privately subscribes to separatist ideologies may try 
to bring about a temporary mutiny against Han employees.    
Besides sometimes taking a work lunch together, the only other time Uyghur 
and Han colleagues socialise with one another is at events organised by the work unit 
(for example, meetings over lunch or national celebrations such as the 40th 
Anniversary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region). These events take place in 
working hours, and members of the work unit are obliged to attend. At meeting 
lunches, Han Chinese and most Uyghur present tend to drink large amounts of baijiu 
and make constant toasts. It is possible that alcohol and the act of honouring one 
another through frequent toasting further helps to smooth interaction. Beyond this, 
Uyghur never visit the homes of Han colleagues, and Han Chinese rarely enter the 
homes of Uyghur colleagues. Han work unit members occasionally pay festival visits 
to Uyghur homes during the Qorban and Rozi festivals, as a gesture of courtesy and a 
 31 
public display of respect for Uyghur culture. These interactions, too, are often 
managed with the help of a generous amount of alcohol.
47
 
Another arena where the two groups seem able to manage interaction at work 
is the local market. Here, some Uyghur and Han Chinese petty entrepreneurs have 
established mutually beneficial working relationships.
48
 I regularly observed scenes in 
Ürümchi where Uyghur and Han Chinese collaborated to increase one another’s 
business, despite the fact that one dealt with halal (‘clean’) meat and the other with 
haram (‘unclean’) meat. At one Ürümchi market, Uyghur youths rent kebab stands in 
front of ‘unclean’ hancan restaurants. To an extent, the location of these stands is 
undesirable for business, since Uyghur customers never eat in hancan restaurants. 
However, Ghäyrät and his fellow kebab-sellers exploit the situation by attracting the 
custom of Han Chinese instead. They call to Han customers and encourage them to 
eat in the hancan restaurant in front of their stand, hoping that the customers will later 
call for some kebabs to be brought in. In return, Han Chinese managers of hancan 
restaurants recommend the Uyghur’ kebabs.  
Since both parties are self-employed and reliant on their own efforts to subsist, 
they can find things in common to talk about when business is slack. Their personal 
relationship remains basically untouched by popular Uyghur perceptions of economic 
inequality because Uyghur here can see that these Han at least are no better off than 
themselves. Uyghur and Han Chinese petty entrepreneurs often sit chatting about the 
amount of money they have earned that day or how much they paid for such and such 
an article. When the talk is limited to money matters in this way, conversation 
remains perfectly amicable. Yet where cultural differences are touched upon, a sense 
of ethnic competitiveness enters the equation and Uyghur and Han tease one another 
about those differences:  
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Uyghur: I went to that wedding on Sunday afternoon. Everyone was dancing. I   
              was dancing too. Uyghur weddings are lively! Not like Han weddings!  
              Han just fetch the bride, stand outside the house, let off a few  
              firecrackers, and then go inside to eat! That’s it! 
Han:      No, the groom has to carry the bride over the threshold! You lot don't do  
              that, do you ?  
 
However, such exchanges do not seem to cause long-term offence, at least not in this 
environment. Everyone is happy to continue warming their hands over the kebab-
sellers’ charcoal embers and devour hot chestnuts. A good working environment has 
been established which remains fundamentally undamaged by religio-cultural 
differences.  
Still, as with relationships between Uyghur and Han Chinese in work units, 
relations between these petty entrepreneurs do not extend beyond the working 
environment. The only instance of Uyghur stallholders socialising with Han Chinese 
outside work was at the market pool tables. There, Ghäyrät and others often played 
pool with Han Chinese when taking a break from work. However, the opponents said 
little to one another throughout the game, which was characterised by a tangible 
element of ethnic competition. When the game was over, they thanked one another 
and went their separate ways. 
 
The Underlying Factor: Perceived Socio-Economic Inequalities 
Important as symbolic boundaries are, it is the ‘food boundary’ which has become the 
primary means of drawing ethnic distinctions between Uyghur and Han Chinese in the 
1990s, allowing Uyghur to ensure spatial and social segregation between the two 
groups on a day-to-day basis. Yet they often compromise this boundary, and usually 
in situations where they stand to gain socially or financially. Uyghur find jobs in Han 
work units and move to New Towns in order to secure a home, a steady income, and a 
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livelihood. Uyghur restaurant owners oblige their Uyghur customers to use the same 
chopsticks, cutlery, and crockery as Han customers because they need (or want) the 
extra custom. Uyghur students choose to share dorms with Han Chinese students 
because their studies and career chances will improve if they speak better Chinese. 
Uyghur petty entrepreneurs co-operate with their Han counterparts at the local market 
as a strategy to improve business, and so forth. In situations where they stand to 
benefit, Uyghur often forgo the supposedly hard-and-fast rules surrounding concepts 
of ‘clean’ and ‘unclean’ food (and people), and can forge relatively amicable 
relationships with Han Chinese, at least on the superficial level. However, the 
compromises made in these situations are not extended to other situations. 
Presumably, it should be possible to invite Han Chinese to Uyghur social events, 
provided that they conform to Uyghur dietary habits for the duration. But Uyghur are 
clearly not willing to do this. Even in the Han Chinese dance halls, where Uyghur and 
Han might share a love of ballroom dancing, they choose to sit separately.  
Yet there is evidence that there was less social segregation of Uyghur and Han 
Chinese in the past. Uyghur in their thirties or forties told me that, during their 
childhoods, they had sometimes entered the homes of Han Chinese playmates. At that 
time, differences of diet had been ‘managed’ whereby Uyghur children were allowed 
to play in Han Chinese homes so long as they did not eat or drink anything while 
there. At the present time, however, there are almost no instances of Uyghur children 
socialising in this way. Similarly, giving up pork was once the prerequisite for a Han 
Chinese to marry a Uyghur, but this is no longer enough. Whether purely for religio-
cultural reasons or for other reasons, public disapproval has made intermarriage 
practically impossible in recent years. That Uyghur children no longer have Han 
Chinese friends and that intermarriage between adults is no longer an option suggests 
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that, in addition to long-standing religio-cultural differences, there are other new 
factors making the estrangement between Uyghur and Han adults more pronounced, 
and leading Uyghur to keep themselves and their children segregated. Most salient 
among these is a growing awareness of socio-economic inequalities. In the present 
context, urban Uyghur have begun to emphasise religio-cultural differences and use 
them as symbols to demarcate ethnic boundaries between Uyghur and Han Chinese in 
what is actually an articulation of demands for ethnic equality in education and work, 
and the control of Xinjiang’s natural resources. 
 
Conclusion  
Uyghur national identity in Xinjiang in the 1990s defines itself in relation to Han 
Chinese immigrants in an ‘Us and Them’ dichotomy. In emphasising the failure of 
Han Chinese to adhere to Islamic social laws, Uyghur define the differences between 
themselves and the non-Muslim Han along religio-cultural lines. On another level, 
however, they define themselves as an ethnic group in competition with Han Chinese 
in a new urban social hierarchy. To state that increased interaction between Uyghur 
and Han Chinese is necessarily conducive to increased ethnic tensions would be too 
simple. The fact is that the proportion of Han Chinese immigrants within Xinjiang’s 
total population had already grown to 40 per cent (roughly equal to somewhat 
questionable official estimates in 1996) by 1970. Yet instances of ethnic conflict did 
not begin to accelerate until the end of the eighties and the start of the nineties.
49
 
Similarly, we hear that just one generation ago, Uyghur and Han children were 
allowed to play in each other’s homes, that intermarriage between Uyghur and Han 
was common across the region, and that Uyghur colleagues visited Han Chinese 
colleagues at home during the Spring Festival. 
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What is clear is that Uyghur attitudes towards Han settlers have changed 
significantly over time (while religio-cultural differences have existed between them 
all along). Whereas it is said that the Uyghur originally “welcomed the Han Chinese 
with open arms,”50 Uyghur in the nineties say they want the influx of Han immigrants 
to stop. The fact that Uyghur distinguish between first-generation and new Han 
immigrants further confirms this change of heart. The distinction is reflected both in 
the way Uyghur speak about original and new settlers, and in the nature of the 
relationships they enjoy with each. The improved relationships they have with 
original settlers are characterised by a willingness on the part of Han Chinese to learn 
the Uyghur language and adapt to Uyghur customs (for example, Han Chinese giving 
up pork). Worsening relations with new Han immigrants, on the other hand, result 
from a growing unwillingness on the part of the Han to embrace or even try to adapt 
to Uyghur culture. 
Over and above the Great Han chauvinist attitudes prevalent in urban 
Xinjiang, it is the daily reality of the marginalisation of Uyghur in education and work 
that most affects contemporary Uyghur-Han relations. Since working in Han Chinese 
work units and companies requires fluency in Chinese (and, unofficially, acceptance 
of the Han culture), many Uyghur have been excluded from the Han-dominated 
labour market almost by default. Unqualified for white-collar jobs, Uyghur end up 
doing blue-collar jobs or remain in traditional agricultural roles. The result is 
widespread resentment at Han Chinese privilege. Televised publicity of ‘success 
stories’ of Han Chinese immigrants, added to the daily sight of Han Chinese living in 
clean new housing and driving (and apparently owning) brand new cars,
51
 only 
exacerbates these feelings. Although Han Chinese have created a new urban job 
market in Xinjiang, as well as putting mechanisms in place to facilitate the 
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exploitation of the region’s natural resources, few urban Uyghur believe that they 
have profited from these developments. Uyghur standards of living are at least the 
same and probably substantially better than they were before 1949. However, urban 
dissatisfaction stems from the fact that Uyghurs now have something to compare 
themselves with. 
Finally, the ‘contamination effect’ of the vision of the adjacent CIS republics 
should not be underestimated. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 
the establishment across the border of six independent Muslim republics (Azerbaijan, 
Qazaqstan, Özbäkistan, Qirghizstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), the Uyghur, the 
Tatar, and the Salar became the only Central Asian Muslims in Xinjiang without an 
independent country named after their ethnic group.
52
 Since that time, the mass media 
have enabled Uyghur to sit and watch as their newly independent Muslim cousins 
took control of their social, political, and economic structures and of the exploitation 
of their abundant natural resources. 
This paper suggests that religio-cultural differences alone might have been 
managed in such a way that Uyghur and Han Chinese were able to interact in 
situations where those differences were not felt to matter. However, growing 
resentment of ethnic discrimination and socio-economic inequalities, added to the 
knowledge that other Central Asian Muslims now enjoy control both over their 
politics and their economic development, has led Uyghur in the 1990s to exaggerate 
certain religio-cultural differences as a means of ensuring symbolic, spatial, and social 
segregation from the Han. 
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1
 The system employed by Hahn in Spoken Uyghur is adopted to transliterate Uyghur terms, as I 
consider this to be closest to local pronunciation. However, I make two changes: the consonant “ğ ” is 
replaced with “gh,” and the consonant “č ” with “ch.” 
2
 Published articles include Dru Gladney (1996), Sean Roberts (1998a), Ildikó Bellér-Hann (1997, 
1998, 2001a, 2000b), Joanne Smith (2000), and Cristina Cesaro (2000). Scholars who have recently 
completed (or are on the verge of completing) PhD theses based on fieldwork in Xinjiang include 
Rachel Harris (1998), Joanne Smith (1999), Jay Dautcher (1999), and Gardner Bovingdon. 
3
 Since this article was submitted and accepted for publication in July 2001, I have had the good 
fortune to finally meet Ildikó Bellér-Hann. In our subsequent communications, I became aware of her 
(then forthcoming) chapter on Uyghur-Han relations, also dealing with strategies employed by Uyghur 
to reproduce ethnic boundaries vis-à-vis the Han (Bellér-Hann 2001c). With regard to similarities 
between our data and the theoretical frameworks we adopt to express those data, I would note that we 
carried out fieldwork at the same time in Xinjiang independently of one another and wrote our 
respective pieces unaware of the other’s work. Coincidental similarities in approach may therefore be 
considered mutual validation of our assessment of ethnic relations in Xinjiang. Indeed, the two articles 
can be treated as complementary, since my ethnographic material is based mainly on fieldwork in 
Ürümchi (population 90% Han, 10% Uyghur), while that of Bellér-Hann focuses on a small oasis town 
in southern Xinjiang (population 40% Han, 60% Uyghur). This difference in geographical focus and 
population composition accounts, I believe, for certain differences in our interpretations. 
4
 The material presented here first appeared in Chapters 9 and 10 of my as yet unpublished PhD thesis 
(Smith: 1999). Funding for postgraduate study was kindly provided by the Economic and Social 
Research Council, Swindon, UK. 
5
 See Barth 1969: 10,14; De Vos 1975: 9; Eriksen 1993: 37. 
6
De Vos 1975: 16. 
7
Barth 1969: 12. 
8
Barth 1969: 9; Eriksen 1993: 10-12, 35. 
9
Edmund Leach. (1967) A Runaway World. London: Oxford University Press. Cited in Epstein 1978: 
100. Cf. Sartre’s theory of “us-hood” and “we-hood” (Jean-Paul Sartre. [1943] L’être et le néant. Paris: 
Gallimard. Cited in Eriksen 1993: 67). 
10
 Gladney (1996) has developed a similar model – which he calls “relational alterity” - to deal with the 
question of transnational Hui, Uyghur, and Qazaq identities, arguing that “people subscribe to certain 
identities under certain highly contextualised moments of social relation.” Locating the emergence of 
national identities in Central Asia within this field of contemporary and historical social relations, he 
draws attention to the “shifting simultaneity of identity,” and shows how different identities are 
constructed in different social contexts vis-à-vis a number of different “opposites.” 
11
 Oda 1978: 42. 
12
 Gladney 1990: 10. 
13
 Ibid: 4. 
14
 Rudelson 1997. 
15
 Between 1949 and 1970 alone, the percentage of Han immigrants in Xinjiang increased from 5.5 per 
cent to a staggering 40 per cent (Dillon 1995: 31). By 1990, there were 5,695,626 Han immigrants in 
the region compared with 7,194,675 Uyghur
 (Thomas Hoppe. 1992. “Die chinesische Position in Ost-
Turkestan/Xinjiang.” China aktuell. June. p. 360. Cited in Dillon 1995: 48). According to estimates 
based on an official Chinese survey of population change carried out in Xinjiang in 1996, Han Chinese 
immigrants totalled 6,424,400 persons while local nationalities (including Uyghur) totalled 10,468,500 
persons or 61.97 per cent (Xinjiang statistical communiqué for 1996, Xinjiang ribao, Ürümchi, 14 
March 1997 in SWB [Asia Pacific], 7 May 1997, FEW/0485 WS2/8). However, population figures 
released by the Chinese authorities in recent years for these regions have been less than reliable. 
Shakya notes, for instance, that China has repeated identical population statistics for Tibet for the past 
several years (Talk on his book The Dragon in the Lands of Snow at Waterstones of Leeds, UK. 
3/2/99). 
16
Attitudes of Han racial and cultural superiority. 
17
 Some Uyghur educated at Uyghur schools do reach university, and this number is likely to grow as a 
result of the implementation of the self-paid school system. However, these students generally struggle 
with academic texts (which are printed in Chinese) once there, and may take more years to graduate. 
18
The term used by both Han Chinese and minority nationalities for a member of a minority nationality 
educated in their mother tongue at a minority nationality school.  
19
 The term used for a member of a minority nationality educated in the Chinese language at a Han 
Chinese school. 
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20
 The same issues seem to be relevant in Tibet. Tsering Shakya identifies Tibetan awareness that they 
have not benefited from economic reforms and will always be marginalised vis-à-vis Han immigrants 
as the impetus for post-1987 demonstrations by young urban Tibetans (“China-Tibet: Further 
Dialogue?” East Asia Research Seminar. Leeds University, UK. 17/2/99). Rural Uyghur, on the other 
hand, have so far been relatively unaffected by Han chauvinist attitudes and Han competition for 
education and work, due to the smaller number of Han immigrants in the countryside. They claim to 
have experienced an improvement in their standard of living since Deng’s Open Door policy took 
effect in the mid-eighties. Furthermore, they do not feel that their native language has been 
marginalised in their rural environment, where government decrees are still issued in Uyghur.  These 
factors help to explain why the proliferation of ethno-political ideologies in Xinjiang has so far been a 
predominantly urban phenomenon. 
21
 Cesaro (2000) devotes a paper to analysing ways in which Uyghur draw on Muslim dietary 
prescriptions in order to strengthen boundaries between themselves and the Han Chinese. Her 
fieldwork was carried out during 1996-1997, the year following my own. 
22
 The names of key informants and details of their occupations have been altered to protect their 
identities, although details of age, social group, and hometown are retained. 
23
Mackerras 1985: 77. 
24
Naby 1986: 243. 
25
 He referred to Uyghur, Qazaqs, Özbäks, etc. as the tumin (in Chinese) of Xinjiang, literally, the 
“people of the land,” or the “people of the earth.” 
26
 On discovering that I had set my watch to local time after only a few days in Ürümchi, an American 
ethnographer smiled and said: “Well...what other time is there?” The gesture also met with a positive 
reaction from Uyghur. When Räwiä first noticed that my watch had been re-set to local time, she 
smiled, nodded, and said: “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.” 
27
 This notion may have been engendered by CCP propaganda, which publicises the advantages of birth 
control and points out that many modernising Islamic countries (e.g. Iran) now practise birth control. 
Alternatively, Uyghur may have absorbed the notion from television images of modern nuclear 
families in the West. 
28
 It is generally conceded that Islamic beliefs are stronger in the south than in the north of the region. 
29
 Tursun used the word padišah (“king”) in keeping with Uyghur tradition. 
30
 This is the derogatory term in Chinese designating children of one Uyghur and one Chinese parent. 
The English equivalent would be “half-breed.”  
31
 It has been suggested that Uyghur perceived this new pattern of Han settlement as “encirclement,” 
and that it led to the obscuring of historical oasis divisions and a new focus on rivalry with the Han 
Chinese. Rudelson 1997: 38. 
32
 Five or six-storey residential blocks that became popular in China after Liberation. 
33
 Cesaro (2000: 230, 234) notes that Uyghur in the nineties define categories of forbidden/allowed 
foods according to what people those foods are associated with and not necessarily according to which 
items are explicitly forbidden in the Qur’an. For example, they include donkey in the list of “unclean” 
foods because Han Chinese eat donkey meat. Yet Uyghur from Ili prefecture (and sometimes other 
oases) eat horsemeat as a delicacy. In this way, articulation of the “food boundary” can be seen as a 
form of Uyghur resistance against the Han people. 
34
 Cesaro (2000: 234) similarly notes a tension between what Uyghur say they do and what they 
actually do. 
35
 See also Cesaro 2000: 231. 
36
 See also Cesaro 2000: 232. A computer programmer I knew in Ürümchi was once given a plate with 
Chinese politician Li Peng’s signature on it during a trip to Beijing. He refused it, saying: “No, thank 
you. It’s not qingzhen!” 
37
 Strangely, my findings differ here from those of Cesaro (2000: 233), who writes that Uyghur avoid 
Han-managed qingzhen restaurants on the grounds that the food will have come into contact with a 
Han, and that Uyghur only eat säy (qingzhen stir-fried dishes prepared, structured, and served in the 
Chinese style) if cooked by a Uyghur chef.  
38
 Thick round noodles in spicy tomato, red pepper, and mutton sauce. 
39
 Cesaro (2000: 230) also observed Uyghur reluctance to eat in Hui restaurants and attributes this to a 
lack of trust, arguing that Uyghur inevitably associate the Hui with the Han Chinese. This would 
correspond with my own findings on Uyghur responses towards the Hui preference for “Beijing time” 
over “local time.” 
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40
 Whenever I was invited to Han Chinese homes, Šöhrat and others tried to dissuade me from going: 
“You don’t want to go there! The Han eat pork, and the food will be cooked and eaten out of the same 
pans.” See also Cesaro 2000: 230. 
41
 The inference derives from the common perception that the Islamic faith is particularly strong in the 
southern oasis of Qäšqär. 
42
 Once, a sleeper bus on which I was travelling was delayed by a flood across the road. Presently, a 
truck full of pigs made it through the water from the other side and drove past us. One Han Chinese 
passenger remarked with surprise to his neighbour that a Uyghur had been driving the truck. His 
companion was scornful: “Impossible! When did you ever see a Uyghur transport pigs?” 
43
 Rudelson (1997: 63) identifies pork as the main factor influencing interaction between Uyghur and 
Han Chinese in Turpan: “These social borders may appear invisible…but they become salient in 
structuring interethnic social, religious, and commercial interactions.” 
44
 These include Islamic ceremonies (weddings, funerals, circumcisions, etc.), street-restaurant and 
house parties, group outings to the Uyghur dance restaurant or wuting (Chinese dance hall), all-Uyghur 
university dances, the mäšräp (a mass out-door gathering held during the hot summer months, where 
men and women feast, play dutar, sing, dance, tell stories and jokes, and play games), and the rural 
orchard gathering. For a description of the historical origins and various forms of the mäšräp, see 
Zheng and Luo 1989: 134-137.  
45
 There is a strong feeling among urban Uyghur towards muhalla, a real group determining the social 
relations between individuals, and providing unity and solidarity. Within the muhalla, obligations and 
responsibilities are placed upon individuals in return for support and services, so that members 
celebrate weddings and festivals together, organise funerals and rituals together, and help one another 
when needed. Urban Uyghur often complain that muhalla life is disappearing in the big cities, 
particularly Ürümchi, thinking this the result of the large Han presence (Colin Mackerras, personal 
communication). 
46
 He used the Chinese term libukai to describe the notion of Uyghur and Han Chinese being 
inextricably linked to one another, the same term frequently used in CCP propaganda to encourage 
“nationality unity.” 
47
 In the 1980s, it was apparently common for Uyghur to visit their Han Chinese colleagues at home 
during the Chinese Spring Festival. However, this kind of social exchange has become very rare 
recently (Colin Mackerras, personal communication). 
48
 The occurrence of an ethnic group establishing mutually advantageous patterns of transaction with 
other groups (e.g. trading relations) has been termed ethnic symbiosis. Barth 1969: 20. 
49
 See Smith (2000) and Smith (1999), Appendix I: ‘A catalogue of Uyghur disturbances in Xinjiang 
1949-1997.’ 
50
 cf. Ömärjan Alim’s song Mehman Bašlidim (“I Brought Home A Guest”), banned by the Chinese 
authorities soon after release.  
51
 Such vehicles are often the property of the Han work unit and are not actually privately owned by the 
individuals themselves.  
52
 The Salar are said to have originated from a Turkmen tribe (Schwarz 1984: 39-40), and therefore 
might be said to have their own country in Turkmenistan. The Tatar and the Salar in Xinjiang 
numbered only 4,821 and 3,660 persons respectively in 1990 (compared with 7,194,675 Uyghur). 
Thomas Hoppe. (1992) “Die chinesische Position in Ost-Turkestan/Xinjiang.” China aktuell. p. 360. 
Cited in Dillon 1995: 48. 
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